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perspectives informed by historical and present-day violence. Comparatively speaking,
whereas a western postsecularism can entail the rethinking of Christianity, an Indian
postsecularism can entail the rethinking of a political formulation, of secularism as a state
policy where the state assumes a principled distance from religion.
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“A straightforward narrative of progress from the religious to the secular,” Talal
Asad has argued, “is no longer acceptable” (Asad 2003, p. 1). Asad makes this
assertion in Formations of the Secular, one of many works challenging the
secularization thesis, that as societies become more modern – from agrarian to
industrial to post-industrial – they become more secular, relying less on religion
for a sense of security, and increasingly limiting religion to the private sphere.
Asados work offers an intriguing challenge, for it opens a theoretical space for
rethinking the relations – political, philosophical, and otherwise – between the
religious and the secular. Postsecularism has emerged in recent years as a set of
theoretical interests, orientations, and questions across a range of fields, including
political science, history, religious studies, philosophy, and literary studies.
Postsecularism can serve as the name for the challenge to the secularization
thesis. My focus in this article is on the possible relations between postsecularism
and postcolonialism. As I have asked elsewhere (Ratti 2014a, 2014b), what does
postsecularismmean for andwithin postcolonial nation-states?Theways inwhich
the postcolonial can inflect the postsecular are theoretically similar to the
relations between postcolonial literature and Western literature, and how the
former can, according to Robert J. C. Young, uncompare and recompare the
universal terms of the latter (Young 2013, p. 688). For Young, the postcolonial
“domesticates the foreign, detranslating and retranslating the terms of its own
forced comparatism, comparing where it was uncompared, uncomparing where it
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was invidiously compared, recomparing on its own terms” (ibid., p. 689). I focus in
this article on postcolonial India, where the philosophical and religious secular of
Western traditions becomes translated into politics as a state policy of secularism.
Comparatively speaking, whereas a Western postsecularism can entail the
rethinking of Christianity, an Indian postsecularism can entail the rethinking of a
political formulation. In the latter case, such rethinking can occur fascinatingly in
the forum of literary fiction, with its constitutively creative and facile reimagining
of the abstractions and violence of the political, the historical, and the religious. I
read in particular Amitav Ghoshos novel The Shadow Lines (1988), which
contains a series of charged reflections on Partition and the East Pakistan
genocide of 1964.
To begin with postsecularism in the West, American society stands as an
exception to the secularization thesis, given its combination of technological
modernity and its large number of religious believers. This is perhaps among the
factors that has led some American scholars to reflect upon postsecularism, as
demonstrated in recent special issues of boundary 2 and American Literature. In
the Spring 2013 special issue of boundary 2 on “Antinomies of the Postsecular,”
scholars with a range of interests – postcolonialism, queer theory, feminist theory,
religion, philosophy – question and critique the presuppositions of postsecula-
rism, such as the kinds of secularism (historical, philosophical, Christian,
transcendental, political, among others) that it can assume. In the December
2014 special issue of American Literature on “After the Postsecular”, Peter
Coviello and Jared Hickman examine what they term postsecular 1, postsecular 2,
and postsecular 3. For Coviello and Hickman, postsecular 1 is “the attempt to
examine the historical past unburdened by a particular fantasy of the inevitable or
necessary supersession of something called preligiono” (Coviello and Hickman
2014, p. 646). It is here where Asados challenge to the secularization thesis is
particularly relevant. The epistemological and methodological “self-interroga-
tion” that results from Covielloos and Hickmanos conception of postsecular 1 is
what they term postsecularism 2. The latter is marked by their question, “what
habituated forms of thought, what orthodoxies major and minor, might get
reconfigured from the ground up if imagined away from their anchoring in an
implicitly secularizing framework?” (ibid., p. 647). This then leads to postsecu-
larism 3, the ways in which re-thinking modernity and modern life might occur
under a condition other than secularity, in place of which they propose globality.
Of the above three senses of the postsecular, postsecularism 2 offers some of the
most interesting overlaps within the Indian postcolonial context of state
secularism. It is here that writers can reconfigure and reimagine some of the
orthodoxies of nation and nationalism, and associated concepts like majoritaria-
nism and minoritarianism. In my book The Postsecular Imagination, I examine
literature as that site where writers can represent those orthodoxies while they
endeavor, experimentally and riskily, to reimagine ethics of belief and coexistence
within a religiously and ethnically pluralistic nation-state. Coviello and Hickman
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develop their conceptions of the postsecular with reference particularly to the
American context and American literature.
1. Postsecularism and Postcolonialism in India
In this section, I examine the Indian context of postsecularism, to show the
multiple faces of the secular and its postings within a global context. I want to
begin by showing the differing conceptions of the term “secular” in Western
contexts, since the Indian conception of secularism is influenced by the latteros
Western genealogies.
The term “secular” has spatial and temporal dimensions, both with Christian
inflections. It is derived from the Latin noun saeculum, which, according to the
Oxford English Dictionary, can denote “age” or “generation,” and, in Christian
Latin, “the world.” Each of these is the age, generation, or world to which
humanity belongs, in opposition to the timelessness and world of God. “Secular”
also referred to clergymen who lived outside the monastery, and therefore in the
“world.” Secular thus can designate the observable here-and-now, the visible
world, a category distinct from religion, given the latteros ideas of the transcen-
dental. Secularization in Western societies is the name for the various processes
that separated institutionalized religion (for example, “the church”) from the
state, pushing religion into the private sphere; the termos oldest meaning is the
stateos expropriation of church property (Pecora 2006, p. 13). Secularization can
be a specifically political term, denoting the relation between the political and the
religious as amodel for the organization of the state, and its ultimate relation with
the nation. According to Vincent Pecora, “the practical link between moder-
nization and secularization remains alive andwell, and that the role of pscienceo as
an antidote to psuperstitiono remains a significant part of what major Western
social institutions – from the academies to the courts of law – consider the social
good” (ibid., p. 17). Secularism is the name for the ideologies that emerge
alongside or as a result of secularization, such as the ideology that people should
confine their beliefs towhat they can observe in thematerial world, or that to have
a secular outlook, including the belief that state and religion should be separate, is
to bemodern, progressive, and rational. The word “secularism” was coined by the
British theologian George Holyoake in 1851 to denote this confining of belief to
the observable and material world.
In India, secularism has a specific sense as a state policy, and it is including in
relationwith this political sense of secularism that writers can imagine postsecular
possibilities. As a postcolonial state policy, secularism has had to do enormous
work over and across a nation that is highly diverse religiously and ethnically, one
in which the state assumes (or sees itself assuming) a principled distance from all
religious communities. (To say nothing of the imposition of the idea of “nation”
onto India.) The idea and ideals of state secularism have deep resonances in India,
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becoming virtually synonymous with nationalism. This nationalism is important
given the role of nationalism in anti-colonial struggles and postcolonial nation-
building ambitions and pressures – protecting democracy and minority rights –
since India attained independence in 1947 from British rule. To its credit, the
policy has been flexible in accommodating various religious and ethnic groups.
Despite the almost intuitive value of secularism as a nation-building state
policy, even termed Nehruvian secularism for independent Indiaos first Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehruos commitment to a religiously neutral state, secularism
in India has faced several crises. Not least among these crises is continuing
violence, such as the massacre of Sikhs in 1984, the destruction of the Babri
mosque in 1992 and the massacre of Muslims in Gujarat in 2002, in retaliation
against amobofMuslims burning a train containingHindupilgrims.Among other
examples, 1985 saw an elderly Muslim woman, Shah Bano, successfully petition
the Supreme Court for alimony. Conservative Muslim leaders argued that the
state should not interfere in personal divorce laws established by and for religious
communities. Prime Minister Rajeev Gandhi reversed the Supreme Court
decision, amove perceived as not only placatingMuslim voters but also neglecting
womenos rights. In 1989, the Mandal Commission recommended a significant
increase in quotas in governmental jobs and educational institutions for members
of scheduled castes and tribes, a decision that remains controversial in India,
criticized by upper-caste Hindus. Also in 1989, armed conflict began in Kashmir,
Indiaos only Muslim-majority state, with insurgents seeking independence for
Kashmir. Where the Indian state could have used diplomacy, its response in the
1990s was brutal, converting Kashmir into a conflict zone under the pretext of
“protecting” secular nationalism.
In postcolonial nation-states, where the combination of religion and nationa-
lism continues to be explosive and often violent, the postsecular does not
represent a return to the kinds of realisms and imaginaries of religion that fuel
violence. Similarly, the postsecular is neither a rejection of nor a substitute for
political secularism. It does not signal a teleological end of secularism.Rather, it is
an intimately negotiated term. Postsecularism advocates neither a religious,
sectarian nation-state nor the uncritical espousal of religious belief at a personal
level. Even my efforts at clarifying that the postsecular is not a return to the
religious is at least a sign of the depth of Enlightenment imagination, that
valorizes secularism as the sole bearer of rational progress. Peter van der Veer has
argued that “the very distinction between religious and secular is a product of the
Enlightenment that was used in orientalism to draw a sharp opposition between
irrational, religious behavior of the Oriental and rational secularism, which
enabled thewesterner to rule theOriental” (Breckenridge and van derVeer 1993,
p. 39). Van der Veeros argument is certainly one of many, including Edward Saidos
foundational work on orientalism, which shows the politicization of the secular-
religious divide across the colonizer and colonized, fixing both with immutable
values, whether negative or positive. This politicization can result in a formation
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and opposition such as the “secular West” and the “non-secular non-West,” a
distinction I revisit at the end of this article. Given such a framework, the
“postsecular” could be read catachrestically, as a productive misuse that might
connote “return to the religious”, but in fact denotes its negotiated relation with
the secular.
For Indian writers, postsecularism can mark the exploration of alternatives to
the crises of Indian state secularism while still holding onto the ideals and hard-
won victories of that secularism, which include equality, democracy, fair and just
legal representation, as well as rights across religious, ethnic, and minority
communities. Postsecularism can also mark for these writers a creative search for
(re)enchantment, of suffusing daily life with an ethics and vitality that can capture
the generative intensities of religious faith and practice. This search is acutely
aware of and resists the violence to which religious ideologies have been, and
continue to be, vulnerable in colonial and postcolonial contexts. This is not to
suggest that a postsecular search or philosophy characterizes religion as a whole
by making, for example, an opposition between good religion (characterized as
inspiring ethics) and bad religion (characterized as violence). Rather, a postse-
cular search or philosophy in a postcolonial context is similar towhatCoviello and
Hickman designate above as postsecularism 1. This postsecularism avoids a
fantasy of what Coviello and Hickman term the “inevitable or necessary
supersession” (Coviello and Hickman 2014, p. 646) of religion. Postcolonial
postsecularism recognizes the enduring strength and reach of non-violent
religious ethics (whether from orthodox or unorthodox religious beliefs), but is
also critically aware of the violence to which some of those ethics (variously
appropriated or misused) can be vulnerable. As I stated at the beginning of this
article, within the domain of literature, writers can imagine and question
“habituated forms of thought (…) orthodoxies major and minor” (ibid., p. 647)
concerning secularism and religion, a process Coviello and Hickman term
postsecularism 2. The postcolonialism of the postsecular is thus marked by the
edge of the political, which includes memories of colonial violence, tragedies of
postcolonial violence, the necessary ideals and protections of a democratic secular
nation-state, and the compulsions of everyday ethical values.
By way of redressing the secular-religious divide, and infusing political
secularism with some of the aspirational and affirmational ethics of religious
thought, Indian scholars have offered several re-conceptions of secularism.
Rajeev Bhargava has called for a “spiritualized, humanist” secularism (Bhargava
1995, p. 341). Rajeswari Sunder Rajan and Anuradha Needham, in their
introduction to The Crises of Secularism in India, point to the existence of
indigenous traditions other than state secularism, oneswhich can provide for both
a practised tolerance and inspiring ethics:
there [. . .] continue to be significant traditions of popular tolerance, rationalism, secular
humanism, and attitudes skeptical and ironic about religion, which are not reducible to
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the forms of elite or cosmopolitan secularism that are routinely attributed to the influence
of Nehru and/or a deracinated modernity: in other words, what we might call an
“indigenous” secularism, as belief and practice. It is fairly common to refer to Buddhism,
Kabir, Akbaros Din Ilahi, Dara Sikoh, Ram Mohan Roy and Brahmo Samaj (reformist
Hinduism),Ambedkar and Periyar in this context: amedley of names and influences that
are broadly “secular” in spirit (Sunder Rajan and Needham 2007, p. 21).
Sunder Rajan and Needham list examples akin to “non-state secularisms,” ones
that are largely historical and which affirm values of tolerance, rationalism, and
humanismwithout having the elitismof state secularism (this elitismmeaning that
it is imagined by class-, caste-, and gender-privileged policy makers, whose ideas
do not have the reach and hold of an “indigenous” secularism). Sunder Rajan and
Needham also offer contemporary examples of an indigenous secularism:
But it is not only the past, and not only the “folk,” who give evidence of such a counter-
religious strain. The work of a modern poet like Arun Kolatkar signals the profound
resonance of a skepticism that is marked with compassion and even what we might call,
paradoxically, faith. But there is much work yet to be done on establishing or forging the
connections between this indigenous secularismwhich is part of the intellectual traditions
of India and its ways of life, and official secularism as political ideology (ibid., p. 22).
Althoughwriting in a different context, AdityaNigam, by engaging with the work
of Ashis Nandy, captures some of the flexibility afforded by imagining an “other”
space through which to critique a state system. Nigam has argued that Ashis
Nandy must imagine a “non-modern” space through which to critique the
violence of the nation-state: “He [Ashis Nandy] is concerned with analysis and in
that task he finds the imaginary space of the non-modern a useful reference point
to highlight the violence of the modern nation-state and its drive towards
homogenization” (Nigam 2006, p. 149). Nigamos astute observation of this move
byNandy toward an imaginary space, in this case that of the non-modern, shows a
move similar to the creative ones enacted by writers as they reflect upon the
nation-state and nationalism, and their associated violence, religious and
otherwise. Such imagination and conceptualization are not purely imaginative,
as if disconnected from having to politically and effectively address pragmatic,
practical problems. For example, how do imagined solutions address the real
problems of inequality, suffering, poverty, and other challenges to the goals of
democracy? To invoke two ends of a state power spectrum, how could the
language of the Indian parliament understand and recognize the voice of the
destitute, dispossessed subaltern? What will be the time frame until a constitu-
tional amendment can acknowledge and answer, fully and justly, such disem-
powerment? In the creative and flexible space of literature, such “amendments”
can be placed alongside the originals, thus acting as two trajectories within a single
representational frame. We can consider here Salman Rushdieos The Satanic
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Verses (1988). Rushdie interrogates the nature of religious belief and the
pressures (and discriminations) of transnational migration by combining two
narratives, intimately linking the historical prophet Muhammad with Rushdieos
fictional character Mahound, the demonized version of the Indian character
Saladin Chamcha, who relocates fromMumbai (thenBombay) to London. Such a
rethinking of history resulted, of course, in charges of blasphemy, demonstrating
at least the stakes at play when imagining an “other” space through which to
critique a system, particularly when religion and politics are involved.
2. Postsecularism and Indian Literature
Among Indian literature, Amitav Ghoshos The Shadow Lines (1988) offers
opportunities for reflecting upon how a writer can attempt to represent the
devastating consequences of an historical and political crisis, namely, Partition. I
focus on Partition here as it led to the “secularization” of the Indian state, as a
nation-building project. As “secular India” then emerged, what were the histories
that became necessary for the state to silence and overlook?
The ShadowLines is set in India after Partition (1947), and is specifically set in
the 1964East Pakistan genocide, which culminated as revenge against the stealing
of theProphetMuhammados hair from theHazratbal Shrine in Srinagar,Kashmir.
This genocide affected both East Pakistan and India, with religious majoritaria-
nism combining with nationalism, resulting in violence. In East Pakistan,Muslims
attacked Hindus (some of whom escaped to Calcutta), particularly in Dhaka, and
Hindus attacked Muslims in Calcutta. Although Ghosh does not set his novel
during Partition, two significant historical influences informed his writing of the
novel. The first is thatGhosh himself hadwitnessed the riots of 1964. Secondly, the
memory of the 1984 anti-Sikh pogrom in India, which I mentioned at the
beginning of this article, was still very much alive for Ghosh. Both incidents mark
a crisis of Indian secularism and the concomitant questions it raises about Indian
nationalism. In the wake of Partition, how should we understand what constitutes
secular India and what, in turn, constitutes Pakistan?
Ghosh vividly depicts theHindu-Muslim riots of 1964 inDhaka. The narratoros
grandmother, Thoamma, travels to Dhaka to bring her uncle back to Calcutta. As
their car makes its way through the city, a mob begins to form. Tridibos lover from
England, May, is in the car with the grandmother, while Tridib and the
grandmotheros uncle follow in a rickshaw. When May sees the mob closing in
on the rickshaw, she leaves the car to help Tridib, to the protest of the
grandmother. But May is too late: Tridib and the uncle die. In her subsequent
recounting of the experience to the narrator, May states,
I thought Iod killed him. I used to think: perhaps he wouldnot have got out of that car if I
hadnot made him, if Iod understood what I was doing. I was safe you see – I could have
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gone right into that mob, and they wouldnot have touched me, an English memsahib, but
he, he must have known he was going to die. For years I was arrogant enough to think I
owed him his life. But I know now I didnot kill him; I couldnot have, if Iod wanted. He gave
himself up; it was a sacrifice. I know I canot understand it, I know Imustnot try, for any real
sacrifice is a mystery (Ghosh 1998, p. 251).
May has moved from guilt to “sacrifice” and “mystery,” the former having
religious connotations for her. This process of understanding is uniquely Mayos,
and to emphasize the individuality of the search and questioning, Ghosh writes
this passage from Mayos perspective, to show she can draw upon the language of
Christianity to understand the murder of Tridib, who is Hindu. Tridibos death
becomes an occasion through which Ghosh stresses national, gender, religious,
and racial differences, but the register of ethics is translated by him into a religious
register. The evening ends with Mayos inviting the narrator to stay the night. She
had previously refused such a possibility, so the narrator now states, “I stayed, and
whenwe lay in each otherso arms quietly, in the night, I could tell that shewas glad,
and I was glad too, and grateful, for the glimpse she had given me of a final
redemptive mystery” (ibid., p. 252). Ghosh again makes use of religious diction –
“redemption” – and situates it within the domain of affect, so that “love” has a
certain healing quality, across nation, gender, religion, and race, and perhapsmost
importantly, at a time of tragic recollection. Redemption in this context is inspired
by a religious context, perhaps inspired and/or learned by the narrator through his
intimate contact with May and her Christianity. Yet such “redemption” emerges
from and addresses thoroughly secular struggle and suffering: the political of the
postcolonial, the politics of violence (and the violence of politics), and not any
transcendentalism or escapism.
Suvir Kaul argues that the redemptive mystery that May enables the narrator
to glimpse is “only partly sexual, and is in fact more her providing him with an
emotional vocabulary that has allowed her, and will allow him, to think of Tridibos
murder as psacrificeo” (Ghosh 1995, p. 277). Kaulos criticism captures the sense
that signs still frame the experience forMay, and an ethical frame is still verymuch
present. Transferring the unspeakability and seeming incomprehensibility of the
dilemma to a religious register –which contains its own notions of “love” (Christos
sacrifice, redemption) – gives some perspective and understanding, by providing
both a form (language) and a content (sacrifice). The affective bond that develops
between May and the narrator is one in spite of their national, gender, religious,
and racial differences, especially in a novel committed to interrogating nationa-
lism and its various expressions and consequences (cartography, communalism,
Partition, secularism). Love and friendship, particularly across the real and
imagined borders of nation, gender, religion, and race, can then emerge here as
postsecular values. ShameemBlack has argued that inGhoshos fiction “homes and
family in a postcolonial environment frequently provide alternatives to the nation
and so his domestic spaces and relationships ironically share more with
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cosmopolitan perceptions, actions and ideals than they do with the practices of
bounded communities” (Black 2006, p. 46; emphasis original). As an example of
the limitations of what Black identifies as bounded communities, Ghosh deploys
the rigid nationalism of Thoamma in order to deplore it, to show that it inheres in
the “us versus them” logic of the 1964 genocides. Thoamma is a tragic figure, for as
she travels to Dhaka, she realizes that there is no literal line on the land
demarcating India andPakistan. For us readers, thismight function as ametaphor,
an instructive metaphor pursued by Ghosh to demonstrate that the corollary
“nationalization” of identity has equal, if not greater, devastating consequences as
war and civil war.
In keeping with the title of his novel, Ghosh meditates on the nature of
cartography and of naming, and on the capacity to speak of and represent the
violence and trauma of Partition. Looking back over fifteen years, the unnamed
narrator of the novel states: “Every word I write about those events of 1964 is the
product of a struggle with silence. It is a struggle I am destined to lose – have
already lost – for even after all these years I do not know where within me, in
which corner of my world, this silence lies” (Ghosh 1998, p. 218). The silence is
ineffable, resistant to representation, and in a sense “secular India” relies on such
silence as it sanctions official narratives of the secular state and the corollary
nation-state, leading us back to constructions of “secular India.” Ghosh offers
further reflections on the great difference between the representation of a map
and the catastrophes peoples endure on the ground:
I was struck with wonder that there had really been a time, not so long ago, when people,
sensible people, of good intention, had thought that all maps were the same, that there
was a special enchantment in lines; I had to remind myself that they were not to be
blamed for believing that there was something admirable in moving violence to the
borders and dealing with it through science and factories, for that was the pattern of the
world. They had drawn their borders, believing in that pattern, in the enchantment of
lines, hoping perhaps that once they had etched their borders upon the map, the two bits
of land would sail away from each other like the shifting tectonic plates of the prehistoric
Gondwanaland (ibid., p. 233).
The two bits of land have of course not sailed away from each other, and the
borders have not remained “etched”. Instead, the lands have been closely
intertwined, linked by violence and forcedmigration, both of which challenge the
very stability of any fixed, secular nation-state. It is from this dissatisfaction with
and indeed failure of the enchantment of the etched lines that the narrator
reimagines those lines as the eponymous shadow lines. These shadow lines are
fluid, unstable, and ephemeral lines that are not really “lines”, but in intimate
negotiation with the etched lines. We can read them as a metaphor of the relation
between the secular and its post, with one not existing without the other. State
secularism in India was born as an antidote to religious violence, echoingGhoshos
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words above: “moving violence to the borders and dealing with it through science
and factories”. Here we can read “science and factories” as state rationalism,
which the state expresses through state policies. The narrator also suggests above
that two nations are two lands, ones that could sail away from one another. This
line of thinking is similar to the Two Nation theory, which suggests that different
religious groups (namely, Hindus and Muslims) require different physical
territories, marked as nations. In the above passage, Ghosh also suggests that
violence is a physical object, one that can be moved safely out of sight onto the
margins of borders.We can induce from this themetaphor of violence and religion
as physical objects that state secularism attempts to separate from one another
(and, concomitantly, for the state to “distance” itself, in however principled a
fashion, from religion). Yet the shadows of the lines challenge the lines
themselves. They suggest new possibilities (of belief and belonging) that cannot
be etched and fixed, and ones that are not disconnected from the etched lines
themselves (hence the postsecular does not emerge or exist ex nihilo of the
secular). Ghosh has stated: “writing about families is one way of notwriting about
the nation (or other restrictively imagined collectivities)” (Ghosh 2002, p. 147;
emphasis original). The opposition I find interesting here is between family and
restrictively imagined collectivities, suggesting that state secularism can be seen as
creating an imaginatively restrictive collective. This criticism of state secularism
resonates with the work of Ashis Nandy (1998), who has argued that such
secularism contains an impoverished worldview in contrast to the imaginative
conceptions of religious thought and religious traditions, which have their own
embedded notions of interreligious tolerance.
In her book Limiting Secularism, Priya Kumar argues that Ghosh “undoes the
polarizations of pIndiano and pPakistanio by challenging the spatial imaginary of
Indian and Pakistani nationalisms and their concomitant territorializations of
identity” (Kumar 2008, p. 100). Central to this polarization of national identities is
the idea of secularism, defined contrastively. As Kumar argues, “Only by undoing
narratives of essentialized differences between a psecularo India and a rabidly
pfundamentalisto Islamic Pakistan, as the narrator learns, can we begin to think
about possibilities of multireligious coexistence in the subcontinent” (ibid., p.
105). It is precisely those possibilities of multireligious coexistence that postse-
cularism can imagine, even as a “non-space” that Ashis Nandy imagines, in and
through which critiques of state secularism can exist. In his criticism of The
Shadow Lines, Tuomas Huttunen argues that “Ghosh highlights imagination as a
means of transcending hegemonic official representations” (Huttunen 2000, p.
33). I agree with Huttunen. Ghosh values the imagination (within his novel, and
his novel itself as an act of the imagination) for at least its cognitive value, in giving
peoples recognition of and distance from the hegemonies so deeply embedded in
society and its politics and representations.
The postcolonial reimagining of the nation, particularly of its hegemonic
representations, can serve as an example of Covielloos and Hickmanos definition
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of postsecularism 2, as the reimagining of orthodoxies from, as it were, the ground
up. This is no facile and recreational imagining: it is driven by violence, and here
again is where the edge of the postcolonial can inform thoughtfulness about
secularism.
That same violence can also characterize its opposite, peace. The narrator of
The Shadow Lines offers the following reflection:
In fact, from the evidence of the newspapers, it is clear that once the riots had started both
governments [India, East Pakistan] did everything they could to put a stop to them as
quickly as possible. In this they were subject to a logic larger than themselves, for the
madness of a riot is a pathological inversion, but also therefore a reminder, of that
indivisible sanity that binds people to each other independently of their governments.
And that prior, independent relationship is the natural enemy of government, for it is in
the logic of states that to exist at all they must claim the monopoly of all relationship
between peoples (Ghosh 1998, p. 230).
Among the distinctions that Ghosh develops above is between people and the
state, with people bounded by an “indivisible sanity” that exists independently of
the state. Ghosh also defines that binding by turning to its pathological opposite,
violence, thus indirectly affirming that binding as a form of peace (a characte-
rization supported by the positive valuation of it as “sanity”). Ghoshos description
of state efforts at claiming amonopoly on all relationships between peoples can be
parallel to “state secularism”, which can be contrasted against what SunderRajan
and Needham above describe as “indigenous secularism”. It is in this criticism of
state secularism that Ghoshos writing can be seen as postsecular. This is not to
suggest, however, that any criticism of state secularism is postsecular. Instead, as I
have mentioned above, Ghosh values non-state relationship as a “binding”, and
one that contains peace. It is that binding which suggests a kind of postsecular
affirmation of other people and seeking peaceful coexistencewith them (“binding
sanity”) that offers the positive ethical values of community, belonging, and amity.
This is not to suggest that any postsecular affirmation is final or stable. Rather,
Ghoshos reflections on violence and ethics are experimental, representing a
search rather than any easy answers or final solutions. For example, the narrator
offers the below reflection on fear, in the context of a Hindu-Muslim riot:
It is a fear that comes of the knowledge that normalcy is utterly contingent, that the spaces
that surround one, the streets that one inhabits, can become, suddenly and without
warning, as hostile as a desert in a flash flood. It is this that sets apart the thousandmillion
people who inhabit the subcontinent from the rest of the world—not language, not food,
not music—it is the special quality of loneliness that grows out of the fear of the war
between oneself and oneos image in the mirror (ibid., p. 204).
The closing trope of the mirror foreshadows the narratoros following image of
Calcutta and Dhaka: “[I]n Calcutta, [I] had only to look into the mirror to be in
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Dhaka; amoment when each city was the inverted image of the other, locked into
an irreversible symmetry by the line that was to set us free – our looking-glass
border” (ibid., p. 233). The contingency of normalcy (which I will read also as
“peace”) is what marks any postsecular affirmative values as themselves
contingent, momentary, and tenuous. This knowledge of contingency is postco-
lonial: it is from a historically postcolonial context, and it is skeptical of any
certitudes, knowing that power is always present and negotiations with that power
(across religions, cities, and nations) are never perfectly stable or equitable.
Anshuman Mondal argues that the image across the border “is not an Other but
rather the Self, the divided Indian Self. It is this Self across the border that renders
secular Indian nationalism a failure since it has not united the Self” (Mondal 2006,
p. 28). Mondal echoes here my argument that violence stands as one of the
greatest signs of the failures of Indian secularism (and, by extension, Indian
secular nationalism). Where Mondal argues for disunity as a sign of failure (and,
inversely, for unity as a sign of success), we can use a postsecular critical
vocabulary to theorize this notion of failure and success. Ghoshos image of the
essential sameness across oneself and the other (whether that other belongs to a
different religion, ethnicity, or nation, or all four) takes the tentative affirmational
risk of humanism. I call this a risk because, although the narrator knows any such
humanism is vulnerable to violence and suffused with fear, Ghosh nonetheless
inserts this humanism, however minimally, in the text.
As a brief comparison with Ghoshos novel, we can consider Shauna Singh
Baldwinos novel What the Body Remembers (2000), which depicts the events
immediately preceding Partition. Narrated from a Sikh perspective against the
more dominantHindu andMuslim responses to Partition, the novel questions the
very distinction between “India” and “Pakistan”. I have argued that if “the
nations that are pPakistano and pIndiao are secular entities, enacted through a
secular distinction, thenWhat the Body Remembers is postsecular in showing the
crises and injustices resulting from such a separation. Violence in this novel
becomes the marker of the inadequacies of the national pbordero” (2014a, p. 120).
In his novelTrain to Pakistan (1956), set in a small Indian village in the immediate
aftermath of Partition, Khushwant Singh takes a humanistic approach in
challenging the distinction between “India” and “Pakistan”. He begins the
novel by showing peaceful coexistence among Sikhs and Muslims in the village,
suggesting that loyalty to oneos village is stronger than loyalty to oneos religion.As
the novel progresses, some Sikh men succumb to anti-Muslim hate and plan to
take the lives of Muslim passengers on a train headed to Pakistan. Their plan,
however, is foiled by another Sikhman, who is in love with aMuslimwoman from
the village. Singh thus gestures toward “love” as a challenge to not only religious
nationalism but also, paradoxically in the case of India, state secularism.
The posting of the secular is not only that of philosophical secularism – in the
wake of which posting, there could be a turn to discourses of spirituality – but also
that of political secularism. In a postcolonial nation-state like India, such political
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secularism has considerable significance, extending to minority rights and
freedom of religion. This wide-reaching significance will inevitably fall short of
adequate recognitions and redresses, and it is here that the domain of literature –
including the reading I have undertaken in this article of Amitav Ghoshos The
Shadow Lines – can imagine possibilities and models of peaceful coexistence and
communal harmony. By “postsecular” in postcolonial contexts, I do not mean the
wholesale abandonment of the hard-won struggles of the secularism that aspires
toward democratic and legal recognition of religious difference and, again,
minority rights. In the case of India, such recognition continues to be important
for ensuring democracy. Postsecularism is thus a philosophy or search, which can
be enacted through literature. Consequently, I do not mean to burden the literary
imagination with great expectations, as if it were unremoved from the very real
forces of history and politics. Literature is not religion. Literature is not
secularism. Of course, literature itself is shaped by the forces of secularism and
religion, as my above reading of The Shadow Lines demonstrates, and as
dramatically and tragically demonstrated by the fatwa against Salman Rushdie. I
see the postsecular literary imagination as a forum for imagining, exploring,
searching for, and experimenting with – in risky, individualistic, tentative ways –
solutions to enduring political, secular, and religious challenges, including those of
postcolonialism.
In the American literary context, John McClure has deployed postsecularism
in focusing on the postmodern fiction of writers such as Thomas Pynchon, Don
DeLillo, and IshmaelReed. ForMcClure, postsecular texts are shaped by spiritual
concerns, bywhich hemeans that theymake room for themagical, themiraculous,
and for religious categories (McClure 1995, p. 143). These textso postmodern
features – which theorists such as Fredric Jameson and Jean-Francois Lyotard
have identified, including “assaults on realism” (ibid.), playfulness, and ex-
periments with the sublime – can be understood, argues McClure, as resacrali-
zation (ibid., p. 144). McClure defines resacralization as “spiritually inflected
resistance to conventionally secular constructions of reality” (ibid., p. 143), and as
privileging “non-secular practices and constructions of the real” (ibid., p. 150).
What emerges inMcClureos postsecular analyses is a broad distinction between
the secular and the spiritual. This is not to suggest, however, that such spirituality
is nave escapism or other-worldliness. McClure argues: “the spirituality of these
and other contemporary texts represents itself, then, not as an alternative to
worldliness but as a life-affirming and profoundly worldly alternative to the
psychologically alienating and ecologically destructive pseudo-worldliness of
secular rationality” (ibid., p. 157). Such worldliness consists of “compassionate
identification with a creaturely community that suffers, enjoys, and endures”
(ibid.). It is here where we can find an interesting convergence with postcolonial
postsecularism, where such a postsecularism is not an abandonment of secular
concerns and commitments. Nor can it be a turn, in the postcolonial context, to the
sense of “religion” that provokes violence, the latter particularly attempted to be
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redressed by a secular state policy. The postsecular also cannot offer the
teleologies and certainties that “religion” can postulate because, again, postco-
lonial legacies and conflicts show it is such teleology and certainty that can
provoke and sustain violence. For the postcolonial writer, therefore, any
postsecular affirmation is tentative, a search, a risky exploration, a gesture.
There are no facile “answers”, and here again is a parallel with McClureos
postmodern postsecular. McClure argues that “Pynchon returns us to the domain
of sacred experiences and doctrines, then, but not to set us down in some safe zone
of putative certainty” (ibid., p. 153). Thus, while postmodern fiction can decenter
grand narratives, it does not recentre them, just as Pynchonos and DeLilloos
spiritual searches are marked by quests “to reach and to resist grasping” (ibid.).
That resistance shows the humility of recognizing that one cannot have complete
knowledge. For the postcolonial writer, such humility stems from vulnerability: to
power, to colonial legacies, to present inequities and to the easily manifest
realities of violence.
McClure invokes postcolonial theorists Homi Bhabha and Ashis Nandy to
argue for rethinking postmodernism as constituted by “voices [that] challenge the
hegemony of secular rationalist discourse” (ibid., p. 148), and thus expand the
range of postmodern texts to include works from Latin American, African
American, and Native American writers. The intersection here with postcolo-
nialism is through the route of power, in recognizing that postcolonial theorists
can offer insights into practices of institutional and epistemological exclusion and
marginalization. One possible connotation (and I am not attributing this to
McClure) of such an expanded definition of postmodern texts is the equation of
the non-West with “religion” or “non-secularism”. Since the 1995 publication of
McClureos article, the world has of course become a different place, not the least
because of the rise of social media and of international religious violence driven
by terrorism, provoking rethinking of the distinction between the “secular West”
and the “non-secular non-West”. By turning to diasporic postcolonial writers with
influences from both, say, India and the US – as in the case of Amitav Ghosh and
SalmanRushdie – we can examine how theremight be at least a double posting of
the secular, of both philosophical secularism and postcolonial state secularism.
The postsecularism that such writers reach and gesture toward, explore, and
imagine is one that might decenter some of the most sacred ideas and practices of
majoritarianism, minoritarianism, multiculturalism, nationalism, faith, and reli-
gion, among others.
References
Asad, Talal: Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam andModernity. Stanford 2003.
Bhargava, Rajeev: “Religious and Secular Identities,” in: Baxi, Upendra / Parekh,
Bhikhu. Crisis and Change in Contemporary India. New Delhi 1995.
70
Manav Ratti
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND
Black, Shameem: “Cosmopolitanism at Home: Amitav Ghoshos The Shadow Lines”, in:
Journal of Commonwealth Literature (41.3) 2006, pp. 45–65.
Coviello, Peter / Hickman, Jared: “Introduction: After the Postsecular”, in: American
Literature (86.4) 2014, pp. 645–654.
Ghosh, Amitav: The Shadow Lines. New Delhi 1995 (Oxford University Press).
Id.: The Shadow Lines. New Delhi 1998 (Ravi Dayal Publisher).
Ghosh, Amitav / Chakraborty Dipesh: “ACorrespondence on Provincializing Europe”,
in: Radical History Review (83) 2002, pp. 146–172.
Huttunen, Tuomas: “Narration and Silence in the Works of Amitav Ghosh”, in: Journal
of Postcolonial Writing (38:2) 2000, pp. 28–43.
Kaul, Suvir: “Separation Anxiety: Growing up Inter/National in The Shadow Lines”, in:
Ghosh, Amitav: The Shadow Lines. New Delhi 1995.
Kumar, Priya: Limiting Secularism: The Ethics of Coexistence in Indian Literature and
Film.Minnesota 2008.
McClure, John: “Postmodern/Post-Secular: Contemporary Fiction and Spirituality”, in:
Modern Fiction Studies (41.1) 1995, pp. 141–163.
Mondal, Anshuman: “Allegories of Identity: pPostmoderno Anxiety and pPostcolonialo
Ambivalence in Amitav Ghoshos In An Antique Land and The Shadow Lines”, in:
Journal of Commonwealth Literature (38.3) 2006, pp. 19–36.
Nandy, Ashis: “The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance”, in:
Rajeev Bhargava (ed.). Secularism and Its Critics. Oxford 1998.
Nigam, Aditya: The Insurrection of Little Selves: The Crisis of Secular-Nationalism in
India. New Delhi 2006.
Pecora, Vincent: Secularization and Cultural Criticism: Religion, Nation, andModernity.
Chicago – London 2006.
Ratti, Manav: The Postsecular Imagination: Postcolonialism, Religion, and Literature.
London –New York 2014a.
Id.: “The Postsecular and the Postcolonial”, in: Mason, Emma (ed.) Reading the
Abrahamic Faiths: Rethinking Religion and Literature. London 2014b.
Sunder Rajan, Rajeswari /Needham, Anuradha: The Crisis of Secularism in India.
Durham, North Carolina 2007.
Young, Robert J. C.: “The Postcolonial Comparative”, in: PMLA (128.3) 2013, pp. 683–
689.
71
Rethinking Postsecularism through Postcolonialism
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND
